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ABSTRACT
This article develops an analysis of population-level priority setting informed by Bevir’s 
decentred theory of governance and drawing on a qualitative study of priority setting 
for service improvement conducted in the complex multi-layered governance context 
of English primary care. We show how powerful actors, operating at the meso-level, 
utilize pluralistic and contradictory elements of complex governance networks to 
discursively construct, legitimize and enact service improvement priorities. Our ana-
lysis highlights the role of situated agency in integrating top-down, bottom-up and 
horizontal influences on priority setting, which leads to variation in local priorities 
despite the continuous presence of strong hierarchical influences.
KEYWORDS Priority setting; healthcare networks; decentred governance; primary care; NHS
Introduction
Countries with very different healthcare systems and levels of healthcare spending are 
grappling with the issue of how to reconcile growing demands and constrained 
resources. This problem can be addressed by the process of priority setting, which 
involves ‘decisions about the allocation of resources between the competing claims of 
different services, different patient groups or different elements of care’ (Klein 2010, 
389). Across contexts and levels, population-level priority setting is one of the biggest 
challenges faced by healthcare decision-makers worldwide (Kapiriri, Norheim, and 
Martin 2009; Robinson et al. 2012; Hipgrave et al. 2014; Garpenby and Nedlund 2016; 
Barasa et al. 2017; Petricca et al. 2018). In contrast with bedside rationing where 
decisions are made about withholding resources from individual patients (Klein 
2010; Williams, Dickinson, and Robinson 2011), population-level priority setting 
focuses on healthcare needs of populations at an aggregate level, with its locus at the 
level of governments and institutions (Gallagher and Little 2019).
The growth of population-level priority setting is a consequence of neoliberal forms 
of governance that reproblematize the function of the healthcare system in terms of an 
economics discourse (Joyce 2001). It is therefore hardly surprising that the extant 
literature on this subject is predominantly normative and prescriptive. Health 
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economics and the evidence-based movement have been particularly influential in the 
development of criteria and tools for making formal priority setting decisions 
(Maynard 1997), with the discipline of ethics offering guidance as to how deliberative 
processes of priority setting should unfold (Daniels and Sabin 1997). In practice, 
however, formal, explicit priority setting rarely amounts to more than short-term 
experiments (Light and Hughes 2001), and most ‘real-world’ priority-setting remains 
implicit, non-formalized and context dependent (Klein 2010; Cromwell, Peacock, and 
Mitton 2015; Robinson et al. 2012). However, despite the importance of existing 
practices for implementation of novel priority setting approaches (Teng, Mitton, and 
Jennifer 2007), relatively little is known about how narratives of implicit, non- 
formalized, ‘ad-hoc’ priority setting are constructed and enacted in practice.
To address this gap, this article develops an analysis of population-level priority 
setting whereby the latter is viewed not as a product of imbalance between supply and 
demand, but as a linkage between resource allocation, rhetoric and interests of 
different parties, shaped by a layering of cultural beliefs and social organization 
(Light and Hughes 2001). It draws on a qualitative study of priority setting for service 
improvement in primary care conducted in one of the English regions. Service 
improvement initiatives, aiming to achieve a closer correspondence between actual 
and desired standards of public services, are usually concerned with the performance 
of inter-organizational networks (Boyne 2003). We have therefore chosen to explore 
priority setting in the context of a complex, multi-layered regional network bringing 
together commissioners (Clinical Commissioning Groups, or CCGs),1 operating at 
meso-level, and providers of healthcare services (general practices), representing the 
micro-level of governance (Checkland et al. 2018).
Conceptually, our analysis draws on the decentred theory of governance that views 
policy as a negotiated outcome of diverse and contingent beliefs and actions of situated 
agents which are shaped by historical traditions and evolve in response to changing 
situations and dilemmas (Bevir 2011; Bevir and Richards 2009; Bevir and Waring 2020; 
Bevir and Needham 2017; Bevir and Rhodes 2007). With its focus on the personal agency 
of actors expressed in narratives and stories (Dickinson 2016), this approach is particu-
larly well suited for exploring the interplay between discursive aspects of real-world 
priority setting and the features of a broader institutional landscape (Goodwin and Grix 
2011). More specifically, our study aims to explore how service improvement priorities 
are discursively constructed and subsequently enacted in practice against the backdrop of 
potentially contradictory and inconsistent traditions, policies and rationalities operating 
in the complex multi-layered context of governance networks.
We describe how powerful actors, predominantly operating at the meso-level of 
a healthcare network, construct, legitimize and implement priorities for service improve-
ment by creatively incorporating a range of external influences in their situation-specific 
(and not always internally consistent) priority setting narratives. This leads to a diverse 
range of priorities adopted for implementation within the same broad geographical area, 
which partially reflects the differences in population health profiles across its constituent 
localities but also stems from individual preferences, beliefs and experiences of network 
actors. These findings show that situated agency, rather than being an undesirable 
‘distortion’ (Hofmann 2020), is an integral part of real-world priority setting which is 
an inherently social, political and discursive process (Smith et al. 2014; Garpenby and 
Nedlund 2016). They also highlight that opportunities for situated agency are enabled by 
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the complex – and often contradictory – governance arrangements characterizing public 
sector networks (Jones 2018; Dickinson 2016; Klijn 2012).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents three main perspec-
tives (technical, processual and contextual) on priority setting in healthcare, which is 
followed by discussing priority setting in the context of governance networks. Central 
concepts of a decentred theory of governance are then introduced and applied to the 
contextual view of priority setting, within which our own enquiry is embedded. 
Research setting as well as procedures for data collection and analysis are presented 
in the Case and Method section. The Findings section describes the following three 
themes: (1) Factors influencing priority setting at different levels of governance; (2) 
Translating external influences into priority setting narratives; (3) Enacting commis-
sioners’ priority setting decisions at the level of general practice. The Discussion 
reflects on these themes in the light of the extant literature. The paper concludes by 
outlining the main theoretical contributions and practical implications of the study.
Priority setting in healthcare networks
Perspectives on priority setting in healthcare
Research on population-level priority setting in healthcare can be classified into three 
main perspectives: a technical view, a processual view and a contextual view (Klein 
2010; Petricca et al. 2018). The technical view advocates the development of quantita-
tive tools, such as programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) and multi- 
criteria decision analysis (MCDA), to be used for making resource allocation decisions 
according to formally agreed criteria (Cromwell, Peacock, and Mitton 2015; Mitton 
et al. 2003). Influenced by health economics, these technocratic solutions decontex-
tualize the benefits of interventions in a way which appears to enable investment 
decisions to be made comparatively across diverse clinical areas and populations. 
This approach has been criticized for reducing a complex social process to 
a mechanistic exercise based on arbitrary metrics, for assuming that this exercise is 
immune to gaming and participants’ subjective views, and for underestimating the 
complexity of data and level of decision-makers’ technical competence required to 
make well-informed decisions (Williams, Dickinson, and Robinson 2011; Holm 1998; 
Smith et al. 2014). Furthermore, in a public healthcare system which can be viewed as 
‘a complex composite of many goals’, all attempts to rationally balance these goals 
against each other by technical algorithms are destined to remain highly arbitrary 
(Holm 1998, 1001).
Perceived shortcomings of this perspective have triggered the development of the 
processual view (Holm 1998), which emphasizes procedural justice and fair decision- 
making processes. Informed by the discipline of ethics, this perspective argues that 
resource allocation decisions are rife with moral disagreements and a fair, deliberative 
process is necessary to establish the legitimacy and fairness of such decisions 
(Robinson et al. 2012). The Accountability for Reasonableness framework has been 
particularly influential for guiding deliberative priority setting, formulating four con-
ditions – publicity, relevance, revisability and enforcement – as central to transparency 
and accountability (Daniels and Sabin 1997). Subsequent empirical research into 
deliberative priority setting has however identified several challenges to its enactment 
in practice. Implementation of processual approaches can be hindered by 
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epistemological differences, power and status inequalities, poor translation of technical 
information, limited deliberation and decoupling of the technical and the social forms 
of knowledge (Crompton et al. 2018). Power differentials limit the inclusiveness of 
deliberative priority setting (Gibson, Martin, and Singer 2005), and it can still be 
perceived as unjust due to the failures of knowledge sharing, communication, trans-
parency and mutuality (Gallagher and Little 2019).
Both of these perspectives focus on formal, explicit priority setting and gear towards 
normative prescriptions about how managers can best manage resources (Smith et al. 
2014). However, there is growing evidence that the use of explicit priority setting in 
healthcare remains compartmentalized and peripheral to resource planning and allo-
cation (Robinson et al. 2012), with resources often allocated on an ad hoc basis 
(Cromwell, Peacock, and Mitton 2015; Klein 2010) or to satisfy the most people and 
incur the least opposition (Teng, Mitton, and Jennifer 2007). The latest phase of 
priority setting research, referred to as the contextual view, takes a holistic view of 
the system by examining the dynamics and interrelationships within it (Petricca et al. 
2018). According to this perspective, priority setting requires not only technical but 
also political knowledge and skills (Garpenby and Nedlund 2016) and is driven by 
socially defined criteria which are both arbitrary and changeable (Lian 2001). 
Longstanding structures and organizational relationships can override principles and 
steps of explicit priority setting, and formally agreed priorities do not necessarily 
translate into actual changes to resource allocation (Robinson et al. 2012; Hipgrave 
et al. 2014). Real-world priority setting is influenced by multiple ‘non-technical’ factors 
(e.g. availability of resources, alignment with the Board’s goals and values, compar-
ability of care offered in other jurisdictions), with organizational and political con-
siderations being as important as health-specific decision-making criteria (Menon, 
Stafinski, and Martin 2007; Cromwell, Peacock, and Mitton 2015).
Public sector networks as a context for priority setting
Engaging with the contextual perspective necessitates careful consideration of specific 
cultural and institutional circumstances in which priority setting is taking place. With 
the growing demand for integrated service provision, the quality of public service 
delivery depends on coordinated activities of multiple interconnected organizations 
(Klijn and Koppenjan 2015; Klijn 2012; Osborne 2010) including, for example, com-
missioners and providers of healthcare services at different levels. As a result, priority 
setting for service improvement should be analysed in the context of multi- 
organizational governance networks rather than single organizations (Boyne 2003). 
Governance networks are defined as more or less stable patterns of social relationships 
between mutually dependent but operationally autonomous actors that develop 
around complex policy issues and contribute to the production of public regulation 
in the broad sense of the term (Torfing 2012; Klijn 2012).
In this study, we are attentive to the following characteristics of governance net-
works. Although the network approach to governance emphasizes horizontal coordi-
nation, it can still contain strong vertical or asymmetrical elements (Klijn 2012), 
implying self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy (Torfing 2012; Héritier and 
Eckert 2008). Whilst the degree of central influence varies across individual networks 
(Ferlie et al. 2011) and sectors (Goodwin and Grix 2011), governance networks tend to 
rely on soft rules rather than hard laws because the network mode of governance is 
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based on negotiation and may lack enforcement mechanisms (Torfing 2012; Klijn et al. 
2013). The functioning of governance networks is shaped by a number of external 
contingencies, such as the clarity or ambiguity of policy, the properties of wider 
regulatory and institutional context and historical relationships amongst local actors 
(Waring and Crompton 2020). Finally, whilst the outcomes achieved by governance 
networks can be influenced by the properties of the network itself (such as size, type of 
actors involved, goal consensus, resource distribution and quality of relationships) 
(Varda, Shoup, and Miller 2012; Waring and Crompton 2020), there are also indica-
tions that these factors may matter less to the network performance than the strategies 
of network management (Klijn et al. 2013).
Both the contextual view and the literature on governance networks raise an impor-
tant question about how key priority setting actors respond to contextual influences and 
how these responses are mediated by power differentials. On the one hand, in multi- 
organizational networks no one party can unilaterally and a priori define the nature and 
quality of public service delivery (Klijn and Koppenjan 2015). That means that through 
sense-making and framing, leaders have to construct the resource scarcity narratives in 
ways helping generate and maintain legitimacy and authority needed for implementing 
priority setting decisions (Dickinson et al. 2011). On the other hand, whether resource 
allocation decisions are made by politicians, doctors or managers, the typical pattern is 
that a small group of elite actors rations services for others (Smith et al. 2014; Robinson 
et al. 2012), which requires political astuteness when dealing with the conflicting values 
espoused by different stakeholders and creating sufficient consensus to achieve goals 
(Dickinson et al. 2011; Reeleder et al. 2006).
Given the complexity and variability of factors influencing network management, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that healthcare literature contains examples of both manip-
ulative network actors advancing their own agendas to the detriment of democratic 
accountability (Greenaway, Salter, and Hart 2007) and relatively benign post- 
bureaucratic leadership styles, often taking the form of collective ‘small team based’ 
leadership (Ferlie et al. 2011, 321). This collective, distributed network leadership 
involves a high degree of engagement from health professionals drawn into managerial 
roles, not least due to the fact that shared cultural and institutional structures help 
clinical leaders enrol colleagues in policy implementation (Oborn, Barrett, and 
Dawson 2013). To sum up, analysing priority setting in the context of governance 
networks highlights the complex and nuanced nature of the interplay between multiple 
influences of inner and outer context, on the one hand, and the situated agency of its 
key actors, on the other. This will be theoretically explored further in the next section.
Decentred theory of governance and priority setting
A decentred approach to governance regards networks as constructions of situated 
agents, whose beliefs and actions are instrumental for creating, sustaining and mod-
ifying both policies and institutions. These beliefs and actions are diverse and con-
tingent as they are adopted against the background of multiple (and often competing) 
historical traditions and evolve in the face of changing situations and dilemmas (Bevir 
and Richards 2009; Bevir and Waring 2020). Decentred theory rejects positivist 
accounts of governance that prioritize essential properties of networks, such as size 
and degree of actor interdependence, or universally operating logics of social or 
political life (Bevir and Rhodes 2007). It echoes the governmentality literature in 
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recognizing that policy actors draw on historically contingent webs of belief but pays 
more attention to agency, heterogeneity and variety than reified and monolithic 
accounts of modern power offered by governmentality theorists (Bevir 2011). 
Overall, decentred approach emphasizes contingency and context, focusing its atten-
tion on how policies are constantly (re)made, (re)negotiated and contested in widely 
different ways in various everyday practices (Bevir and Waring 2020). The following 
subsections synthesize key premises of decentred theory of governance with relevant 
empirical insights to inform the aim and research questions of the study.
Traditions and dilemmas
In decentred theory, tradition is a set of understandings an actor receives during 
socialization that acts as an underlying influence – but not as a defining force – on 
subsequent beliefs and actions. Traditions provide a guide to what an actor might do 
rather than rules fixing what they must do, which implies that they can be creatively 
adjusted to novel circumstances (Bevir and Waring 2020). New Public Management – 
an international ideology aiming to increase the effectiveness of public services 
through managerial means (Diefenbach 2009) – can be seen as one of the main 
historical traditions underpinning the rise of priority setting and closely intertwined 
with the associated technologies of performance management and target-setting. The 
rise of explicit priority setting also reflects an increasing convergence between New 
Public Management and the evidence-based movement (Kislov et al. 2019). This 
intellectual landscape provides a variety of social scientific beliefs and associated 
technologies to draw on when constructing and implementing healthcare policies 
(Bevir and Needham 2017).
A dilemma arises when a new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs and 
practices and forces a reconsideration of these existing beliefs and associated traditions 
(Bevir and Waring 2020). Traditions change when actors make variations to them in 
response to specific dilemmas that often stem from perceived failures of governance. 
As actors confront dilemmas against the background of diverse traditions, there may 
arise a political contest over proposed solutions, potentially leading to a reform of 
governance (Bevir and Rhodes 2007). For instance, the network mode of governance, 
often referred to as New Public Governance, is a relatively new tradition that can be 
interpreted as an attempt to address the unintended consequences of earlier market- 
based reforms, such as the fragmentation of the state, by a stronger focus of collabora-
tion and horizontal ties between agencies (Dickinson 2016; Bevir 2011; Osborne 2010; 
Klijn 2012).
A complex and continuous process of interpretation, contest and modification in 
response to dilemmas produces ever-changing patterns of governance which are often 
imbued with contradictions. In practice, the traditions of New Public Management and 
New Public Governance are closely intertwined, manifesting in hybrid forms char-
acterized by a complex overlay of different governance arrangements (Dickinson 2016; 
Klijn 2012). In her analysis of the implementation of integrated care in the UK 
National Health Service (NHS), Jones (2018) shows that distinct policy streams 
based on networks, hierarchy and markets have accumulated over time, or ‘sedimen-
ted’, producing a ‘networked hierarchy’. This hybrid form of governance manifests 
through setting and monitoring targets, reification of national policy and standardiza-
tion of local activities. While in some localities hierarchical forms of control are 
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contested and resisted, in others the perceived need to respond to this regime comes to 
dominate activities of local actors. Markets and formal networks can thus be used by 
the state as statements of ideology to conceal and bolster central control.
Narratives and contingencies
When looking at the interplay between traditions, dilemmas and diverse and contin-
gent meanings in action, a decentred approach calls for exploring actors’ narratives 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2007; Bevir and Waring 2020; Waring et al. 2020). These convey 
complex sets of meanings rooted in historical circumstances and assist actors in 
confronting novel situations and dilemmas. Narratives provide a framework for mean-
ing-making and social practices and are in turn made and re-made through practice. 
While a decentred theory acknowledges there have been paradigmatic changes in 
terms of the dominant modes of governance, such as a shift from hierarchies through 
markets to networks, these changes are not experienced in the same way by all people 
(Dickinson 2016). For example, co-operation between commissioners and providers 
on priority setting can be impeded by clashes of their respective narratives, whereby 
labelling certain rationing practices as ‘unnecessary or wasteful’ by meso-level deci-
sion-makers can potentially antagonize managers and clinicians (Rooshenas et al. 
2015). Narratives therefore reflect contingent responses of actors to dilemmas, with 
different groups often drawing on different traditions to construct markedly different 
narratives (Bevir and Waring 2020).
In her study of policy implementation in English primary care, Checkland 
(2018) highlights interdependence between narratives of policy formulation and 
implementation at different governance levels. At the macro-level, government 
seeks to reduce resistance by setting conditions in which actors are incentivized 
to behave in ways consonant with policy objectives, whilst perceiving themselves to 
be acting autonomously. The resulting absence of clear guidelines leads meso-level 
actors to come up with a system of shifting and ambiguous rules that only get 
reified over time. By contrast, in many studies of priority setting conducted in other 
contexts the central narrative is the lack of autonomy of lower-level authorities 
from the influence of higher authorities (Petricca et al. 2018; Kapiriri, Norheim, 
and Martin 2009; Hipgrave et al. 2014; Barasa et al. 2017), whereby the power of 
local commissioners to lead priority setting is weakened both by the relative 
strength of national government and clinical opinion (Williams, Dickinson, and 
Robinson 2011).
As ‘networks are enacted by individuals through the stories they tell one another 
and cannot be treated as given facts’ (Bevir and Richards 2009, 8–9), applying 
a decentred approach to priority setting would involve focusing on the social con-
struction – and pluralistic nature – of priority setting narratives. We therefore aim to 
explore how service improvement priorities are discursively constructed and subse-
quently enacted in practice through the ability of local agents to create ‘meanings in 
action’ against the backdrop of potentially contradictory traditions, policies and 
rationalities operating in a complex multi-layered network context. Our empirical 
enquiry is guided by the following research questions. What factors influence priority- 
setting at the meso- and micro-levels of a healthcare network? How do situated actors 
translate these influences into formulating priority setting decisions and enacting them in 
practice?
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Case and method
Institutional landscape of English primary care
A number of health systems internationally have embedded priority setting within 
commissioning functions (Dickinson et al. 2011). The English NHS is no exception.2 
The government no longer makes explicit decisions about the allocation of resources to 
different sectors of the NHS (Williams, Dickinson, and Robinson 2011). Instead, 
resource allocation decisions are delegated to clinical commissioning groups 
(CCGs) – statutory bodies that have been responsible for purchasing most of health 
services in the country since 2013. CCGs are comprised of general practices operating 
within a certain geographical area, reflecting policy-driven transfer of commissioning 
functions to primary care physicians (Checkland et al. 2013).
The relationship between CCGs and their member practices is complex. As initially 
constituted, CCGs focus was upon the commissioning of secondary care services, with 
general practices directly commissioned by NHS England (Checkland et al. 2012). 
However, subsequently policy delegated to CCGs the responsibility for commissioning 
primary care services, giving CCGs a role in holding practices to account for the 
services they provide (McDermott, Checkland, and Coleman 2018). In this compli-
cated, networked context characterized by hybrid accountability relationships (Gore 
et al. 2019), CCGs hold responsibility for overseeing some aspects of their members’ 
performance, and for steering some of their activities, whilst practices retain autonomy 
over day-to-day enactment of their contractual obligations.
This has created a complex institutional landscape when it comes to formulation 
and implementation of priorities for service improvement in English primary care. 
CCGs’ governing bodies represent a middle tier of priority setting which is expected to 
exercise some discretion and responsiveness to local population need while adhering to 
higher political expectations (Smith et al. 2014). They provide an internationally 
relevant example of meso-level authorities at the regional level that decide on the 
mix of programmes, resources and strategies for delivering service improvement 
interventions (Hipgrave et al. 2014). At the same time, individual general practices, 
whilst steered by CCGs, largely remain independent businesses providing primary care 
services to populations and thus, at least in theory, are entitled to determine their own 
service improvement priorities at the micro-level.
Data collection and analysis
This study forms part of a broader consultation exercise on priority setting for service 
improvement which was conducted in 2015 in 13 CCG areas within one of the English 
regions. The purpose of this consultation was to engage with key commissioners and 
GPs across all localities within the region in order to understand their service improve-
ment priorities around cardiovascular conditions, identify the support needed to 
implement these priorities, and inform the development of improvement interventions 
in these localities. It found no evidence of formal priority setting approaches being 
adopted across the region, highlighted a significant diversity across different CCG 
areas in relation to the improvement priorities and needs identified, and concluded 
that no single improvement intervention was likely to be accepted with equal enthu-
siasm by all CCGs and/or practices.
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This article, aiming to theoretically analyse some of the findings uncovered by 
the consultation exercise, draws on 45 semi-structured interviews, which were 
conducted with 23 CCG leads, representing the commissioning (meso-level) per-
spective on priority setting, and 22 general practitioners (GPs) without commis-
sioning responsibilities, representing the ‘provider’ (micro-level) perspective 
(Appendix 1). Two overlapping sets of interview questions were developed (one 
for CCG leads, the other for GPs), accounting for differences in job remits of the 
two groups. To supplement and triangulate the interviews, we also analysed the 
content of strategic plans produced by each of the 13 CCGs, with a particular focus 
on service improvement priorities. Documentary analysis was used for confirming 
significant diversity of identified priorities across the region but had limited rele-
vance to the resulting empirical account due to lack of detail on how these priorities 
have been decided.
Data analysis, which was assisted by the NVivo software, unfolded in three phases. 
The first phase, focusing on the construction of an overarching narrative, combined 
the codes derived from the interview guide with a set of descriptive codes that emerged 
inductively. The second phase, utilizing the technique of matrix analysis, focused on 
mapping similarities and differences between the two groups (Nadin and Cassell 2004). 
Four research assistants were involved in the process of coding, with a selection of 
transcripts coded independently and subsequently compared to ensure intercoder 
reliability. Diversity of priorities, multiplicity of factors driving their selection and 
the role of key decision makers were identified as promising directions for an in-depth 
exploration at the third phase. This was led by the first author and was guided by the 
deductive coding framework informed by the theory of decentred governance and 
applied to the whole dataset. Codes produced at all the three phases were then 
combined in an analytical template (King 2004) (Appendix 2). Finally, an iterative 
process of detecting patterns and developing explanations resulted in the articulation 
of the three main themes described in the following section.
Findings
Factors influencing priority setting at the meso- and micro-levels of governance
As illustrated by Table 1, which systematically presents a selection of interview quotes, 
both CCG and GP respondents mentioned multiple factors determining what areas of 
service improvement should be prioritized. It is worth highlighting similarities and 
differences between the perceived determinants of meso- (CCG) and micro-level (GP) 
priority setting. First, the role of financial factors was salient at both levels, but they 
appeared to be framed as ‘cost reduction’ (most often through reducing hospital 
referrals and admissions) by the CCG respondents and as ‘financial incentives’ 
(through national or local pay-for-performance schemes) by GPs. The national pay- 
for-performance incentive scheme, known as the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(QOF), was often cited as the most important factor at the level of general practice:
. . . More often than not, the actual sort of breakdown of QOF into those business groups 
dictates all of the practice approach to the work in front of them really. (CCG 8.3)
Second, as far as the patient-related drivers of priority-setting were concerned, GPs 
were more attuned to the experiences of individual patients:
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. . . You sit [at the chronic disease meeting] and listen and you get, well, the GPs should do this 
for this illness, and the GPs should do that for that illness. And you think, how on earth do we 
do all of that, because then what people forget about is patients come here with their own 
agenda. (GP 2.1)
By contrast, CCG respondents were more likely to rely on population health data and 
emphasized the importance of linking the proposed improvement projects to health- 
related and financial outcomes:
. . . Being able to demonstrate to [the commissioners] what . . . some improvement work could 
do, and showing them the results on a piece of paper and a presentation - that would go a long, 
long way. . . . There are other conflicting priorities, but we need to show what the benefit of 
doing it is between A and B and then showing some outcomes for it . . . (CCG 4.1)
Table 1. Factors determining the selection of priorities for service improvement at the Clinical Commissioning 
Group (CCG) and general practice (GP) level.
Level Factor Illustrative quote
CCG National policy . . . If it’s a national agenda and it comes from up above, then yeah it’ll 
definitely have to be looked into, it’s not a question of whether I personally 
think it is or not. (CCG 5.1)
Population health 
profile
Our four priorities are cancer, COPD, mental health and CVD . . . They are the 
four biggest killers that we’ve got basically and morbidity as well. (CCG 12.1)
Cost reduction . . . We knew initially that our referral rates were very high which was a huge 
cost burden . . . We nominated a triager who’s one of the board members of 
the CCG who now pre-screens the referrals . . . (CCG 6.3)
Audit and performance 
data
The starting point . . . will be CCG priorities . . . CVD is always on there, COPD is 
usually on there, dementia has been on there . . . They’d be long-term areas 
that don’t benchmark well for varying comparison to other areas, usually. 
(CCG 2.1)
Local integrated care 
arrangements
. . . Within our localities one thing that’s beginning to stimulate interest is the 
fact that we now have a local dialysis unit in [the area] and we are entering 
into some discussions with both the providers of the dialysis unit and with 
[hospital] renal unit . . . to actually see how we can give a more generic offer 
around the whole of the kidney agenda (CCG 7.2)
Personal interests . . . We rely on each one of our leads really to be aware of any developments in 
their area, and they will bring things to our monthly meeting and say, look, 
this bit’s important, this is a new policy, we should do this and then we 
discuss it (CCG 8.1)
GP Priorities set by the CCG . . . The CCG have regular meetings, which I think the practice manager and 
[one of the GP partners] do go to. I think they often have a set agenda, so I’m 
not sure why there’s a forum for practices to bring ideas and discuss 
them . . . because the agenda is set by the CCG . . . They have their own 
priorities . . . (GP 13.1)
Patient experience . . . People can’t get in to see the doctor they want to see and there are big 
queues outside every morning. So we’re piloting a triage, we triage all the 
calls and all the patients that want appointments on a Monday morning 
which, again, it’s the early stages. So, yeah, trying to improve patient access 
because it’s a constant source of complaint. (GP 5.2)
Pay-by-performance 
scheme (QOF)
. . . We pretty much go on the hamster wheel that is QOF every year and just do 
whatever’s thrown at you for that. (GP 13.2)
Other financial 
incentives
. . . Financial incentives always work . . . It doesn’t have to be big reward, but 
some recognition of the effort they put in, then I think most practices would 
respond to that. . . . It sounds awfully shallow, but at the end of the day . . . if 
you’re employing extra staff to do it and things, you can’t do it without 
money. (GP 2.1)
Audit and performance 
data
GPs are quite a different breed of people: they like to be compared. . . . If you 
have a league table, they want to be towards the top end of the league 
table. (GP 13.1)
Personal interests . . . It’s an area that really interests me, so I wanted to take it on. (GP 6.1)
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Third, one of the key findings is the prominence of CCG priorities in the prioritization 
work of general practices, leaving the latter with relatively few opportunities to shape 
their service improvement agenda:
. . . We’ve got the quality improvements set to us by the CCG . . . It’s decided for us. I mean they 
do take ideas from practices. However, I can’t help but think that they’re directed from on high 
then as well as to what the whole . . . national targets are . . . . (GP 2.1)
Conversely, at the CCG level, despite some respondents noting that ‘actually you are 
not setting the priorities, they’re being thrown at you’ (CCG 8.2), there was a much 
greater recognition of an important translational role of CCGs, combining top-down 
national policy drivers with bottom-up information flows concerning local population 
health profiles and performance outcomes:
. . . We do now pick things up off national policy, but then we go and have a look at our local 
data for it as well. If it’s not telling us what the national policy is telling us, then we have 
a rethink about it. (CCG 4.1)
In addition, horizontal information flows relating to secondary and community care 
organizations located in the same localities also shaped the CCG service improvement 
agenda, which was often framed as the need to move towards a more integrated 
provision of services:
. . . We’ve had an integrated diabetes service for years now, and I’ve worked really closely with 
the consultant over at [the local hospital] and I wanted to form the same kind of model so that 
our patients would be getting consistent messages wherever they go . . . (CCG 8.2)
Finally, although decisions about improvement priorities are made collectively, the 
influence of powerful clinical leads, with their personal preferences, has been 
a recurring theme throughout the interviews, particularly at the CCG level:
. . . It’s a joint group decision . . . obviously every GP lead wants their disease to be part of that, 
but we have to come to some consensus between us . . . (CCG 8.2)
There’s going to be a kind of a national approach to this . . . but regionally it’s up to you what 
you want to do. So to me I’ll have to see how I interpret it. (CCG 6.2)
Whilst the selection of priorities was occasionally perceived by the less influential 
actors as being set in an apparently random, ‘spin-the-bottle’ fashion (CCG 9.2), it is 
useful to analyse how individual preferences of powerful stakeholders were translated 
into decision-making. This is the focus of the next subsection.
Translating external influences into CCG priority setting narratives
Despite the influence of top-down national agenda in CCG-level priority setting, there 
were several discursive strategies that local powerful actors deployed to rationalize and 
legitimize their decisions. First of all, there were multiple competing policies at the 
national level, whereby ‘one priority may be fighting against the other’ (GP 10.1) and ‘if 
everything is a priority, effectively nothing is a priority’ (GP 5.1). Reflected in the 
vagueness of CCG’s strategic plans, this plethora of policy choices was further com-
pounded by the multiplicity of criteria used to select projects for prioritization, with 
the same decision-maker often using different sets of criteria for different improve-
ment priorities:
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 11
PAD [peripheral artery disease], I decided because we have had a few limb amputations due to 
critical limb ischaemia, and I felt that those could have been avoided and prevented (individual 
patient experience). Then I was a part of the NICE guideline development group of PAD as well, 
so I wanted to address it ASAP (special interest in a clinical area supported by belonging to 
a professional network). DVT [deep vein thrombosis], I put that second on the list because we 
were part of the [regional] DVT pilot project . . . (participation in a professional network). AF 
[atrial fibrillation], I put that on the list because of prevalence . . . (population health profile). . . . 
We’ve got poorly managed patients on warfarin and our prescription of new oral antic-
oagulants is very low as compared to North West and local and national average (benchmarked 
audit data). Then CKD [chronic kidney disease], I put it there because that was something 
I was very keen (personal interest). (CCG 7.1; our comments in italics)
In addition, decision-makers creatively switched between two competing co-existing 
rationalities apparent in the organization of contemporary UK healthcare. On the 
one hand, there is a more traditional disease-specific discourse (exemplified by the 
previous quote), in which healthcare delivery in general (and service improvement in 
particular) is organized along individual clinical conditions or areas of clinical 
expertise. On the other hand, there is a growing tendency to adopt a more holistic 
discourse emphasizing the experience of the patient as a whole and promoting the 
development of integrated care arrangements working across multiple clinical dis-
ciplines and sectors:
. . . It’s interesting how we’ve moved away from focusing so much on specific areas, I think 
last year we had a focus on COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary disease], and we’ve had 
some clinical focus on atrial fibrillation as well. And a lot of the focus is now put into . . . things 
that result in multiple conditions, as if we can affect the whole by dealing with it as a whole as 
opposed to dealing with individual pieces . . . (CCG 9.2)
The most important priorities . . . are more structural and organizational . . . It’s about more 
integrated system wide working across general practice, community services, hospital services, 
mental health services and social care. So that’s more the focus of where we’re looking at the 
moment than specific clinical conditions. (CCG 10.1)
Co-existence of these rationalities further increased the number of discursive choices 
available to decision-makers to rationalize their personal preferences, whereby the 
same improvement project could be prioritized in one CCG and deprioritized in the 
other:
. . . Long term conditions, cardiovascular is my area of work and I’ve become quite passionate 
about kidney health over the years. So I say that kidney health runs through diabetes, runs 
through cardiology, cardiovascular. So if we address kidney health it will address the other 
areas of work as well. So it’s kind of incorporated into other specialities rather than a speciality 
by itself. (CCG 6.2)
I mean CKD [chronic kidney disease], yeah absolutely it’s one LTD [long-term disease], but 
there is multiple of those and we all know that individuals, especially the frail elderly, they will 
have multiple co-morbidities at one time. So we’ll have to ensure that emphasis on a particular 
disease parameter is . . . there’s a balance to it. You know, why CKD, why not diabetes for 
example? (CCG 5.1)
The strategies described above further emphasize the inherently arbitrary and contest-
able nature of priority setting at the CCG level. The next subsection will explore how 
these priorities were translated into the priorities of general practices, over which 
CCGs had relatively limited direct control.
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Enacting commissioners’ priority setting decisions at the level of general 
practice
The most obvious strategy used by CCGs was aligning their improvement priorities 
with the requirements of existing pay-for-performance schemes such as QOF, as these 
represented a significant proportion of general practice income. In those cases where 
the CCGs wanted to stimulate improvement above the existing QOF standards or 
where relevant QOF indicators were not available, additional financial incentivization 
schemes, tied to appropriate performance indicators, had to be introduced to enable 
implementation of priorities at the level of general practice:
. . . QOF incentivizes you to get to a certain target. So say it’s 90% for whatever . . . For practices 
once you’ve got to your 90% or whatever the target might be . . . you’ve then got to go and move 
to the next phase because again as a practice they’ve got to do everything . . . What the [local 
incentivization scheme] should do is pick up that 10%. (CCG 12.1)
. . . Those [indicators] have been removed, [but] we want practices to still do them . . . because 
we still think those indicators are markers of good care, so we’ve asked practices to carry on 
doing those things . . . so we will incentivise people still doing all those things that they’ve 
always been doing. (CCG 8.1)
CCGs in our sample differed as to the breadth of incentivization offered. Some invited 
their practices to bid for additional funding or promoted specialization of certain 
practices in selected clinical areas, enabling the best-performing practices not only to 
resource their own service improvement agenda but also shape the priorities of the 
CCG area as a whole:
. . . We’ve said that one practice has got to take the lead on behalf of the cluster for managing 
the implementation and the commissioning of those services. (CCG 7.3)
We’ve got a fund . . . and we invite people to make a bid for something like a pilot . . . So 
someone [from a general practice] would come and present a bid, we’d have a look at it, we’d 
make amendments and then . . . if it’s good work, we’ll give it to somebody to try for a year and 
then report back to us and if it worked really well, we might say, oh this is something that we 
want to commission long term . . . (CCG 8.1)
Others were critical of selective attention to pilot projects and positive outliers and 
advocated for a blanket approach, applying a relatively limited set of incentivized 
service improvement standards to all practices under their jurisdiction:
. . . In most other CCGs it was just pockets of excellence where a number of practices took part 
[in an improvement project], and the majority never did, so it didn’t really contribute to overall 
outcomes, while in [our two areas] it was rolled out across . . . I’m not very keen on pilots. Pilots 
get you volunteer practices that participate enthusiastically. It makes not one jot of difference to 
population health because it’s not big enough. You have to get every practice involved. . . . I’ve 
written a [local incentivized standard], that’s around 19 areas of work and 40 KPIs which every 
practice is participating in. I’m investing an extra 3.4 million pounds into primary care, so that 
they might achieve these standards . . . (CCG 1.2)
This quote highlights the importance of audit and performance standards in general 
practice, and many CCGs used the embeddedness of benchmarking in the primary 
care culture as a basis for another strategy deployed to translate CCG priorities to the 
level of general practices. This strategy entailed identifying practices whose perfor-
mance indicators in priority areas were worse than those of their peers and targeting 
them for relevant service improvement projects:
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So each practice might have different areas that they want to improve on . . . You might find one 
practice, for example, needs to look at their prescribing of benzodiazepines, whereas another 
practice needs to look at their ear, nose and throat referrals, whereas another practice needs to 
look at their diagnosis of COPD, whereas another practice needs to look at their treatment of 
CKD patients. (CCG 11.2)
. . . We usually from the CCG get a list of things and they say, pick three of these. . . . And it’s 
usually tied in to how well we’re doing . . . So they will usually say, well, look, you need to do 
some of the ones where you’re doing worse compared to everyone else, rather than the things 
you’re doing well at. (GP 13.1)
Discussion
We have presented real-world priority setting for service improvement as a process 
taking place in the context of a complex multi-layered governance network. Previous 
research suggests that in the absence of formally agreed criteria, complex and intercon-
nected structures of healthcare governance networks may constrain opportunities for 
lower-level authorities to reallocate resources, and that implicit priority setting may be 
influenced by historic patterns of allocation that become institutionalized, restricting 
viable future priority setting options (Smith et al. 2014). Our findings, however, point 
towards a more nuanced picture (Figure 1). On the one hand, real-world priority setting 
in primary care is indeed shaped (and often significantly constrained) by multiple 
political and institutional factors operating at different levels of governance. On the 
other hand, decentralizing influences are also apparent. These most often take the form 
of locally collected population health data reflecting cross-area differences in population 
health profiles and informing bottom-up knowledge flows between the micro- and meso- 
levels of governance. In addition, there are also horizontal influences, for example 
considerations given by CCGs decision-makers to their local links with secondary care 
providers and other integrated care arrangements within their localities.
But how do these vertical and horizontal influences translate into the formulation 
and enactment of actual priorities for service improvement? We have addressed this 
question using the decentred theory of governance which highlights the interplay 
between the narratives of network actors and the complex socio-political context in 
which they are embedded (Goodwin and Grix 2011). It is exactly this complex, multi- 
layered landscape that enables CCGs, as meso-level agents of priority setting, to 
construct and enact narratives of priority setting bringing together national policies, 
regional integrated care landscapes and divergent local interests of general practices. 
Furthermore, rather than seeing historical patterns constrain priority setting at all 
times (Teng, Mitton, and Jennifer 2007; Smith et al. 2014), this study suggests that 
these patterns may also contain dilemmas and contradictions that can be deployed by 
network actors to their advantage. What results is an emerging variation in local 
priorities despite the continuous presence of strong hierarchical influences.
By describing this process, this study highlights how different groups of contextual 
factors – as well as opposing underlying policies and rationalities (such as the disease- 
focused paradigm and the service integration paradigm) – can be selectively deployed by 
the same actor depending on the priority setting narrative they are trying to construct, 
often reflecting their own personal agenda. Interestingly, the development of narratives 
switching between competing policies and rationalities did not seem to be accompanied 
by the experiences that could be interpreted as ‘dilemmas’ as defined in the classic 
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formulations of decentred theory, i.e. as a clash between the dominant tradition and 
perceptions of actors, leading to modification or rejection of this tradition (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2007). In our case, dilemmas manifested not as confrontations between new 
ideas and existing practices (Bevir and Waring 2020) but as highly contingent situation- 
specific choices between different competing policies and rationalities on offer. Most 
importantly, our findings suggest that posing and resolving such dilemmas may help 
Figure 1. Priority setting in a multi-layered governance context.
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situated actors incrementally advance their agendas without triggering major change, 
disrupting the status quo or resolving underlying contradictions or inconsistencies.
These contradictions and inconsistencies stem from hybrid, sedimented nature of 
governance traditions characterizing contemporary policy context of Anglo-Saxon 
countries and combining hierarchies, markets and networks (Dickinson 2016; Jones 
2018). On the one hand, absence of explicit, formalized priority setting approaches 
(such as the ones described in the literature review as ‘technical’ or ‘processual’) in the 
region we examined can, for instance, be explained by the mismatch between the 
underlying assumptions of formal priority setting, which arose in response to New 
Public Management and the evidence-based movement, and the network aspects of 
English primary care context shaped by New Public Governance. At the same time, our 
findings also suggest that contradictions between different layers of traditions consti-
tuting sedimented governance become embedded in policy ‘master frames’ and there-
fore taken for granted by network actors, who creatively incorporate them in their 
individual narratives (‘local action frames’) of implicit priority setting (cf. Torfing 
2012; Waring et al. 2020). This helps explain why the latter may end up being 
inconsistent in themselves and at odds with one another.
Similar inconsistencies and tensions are capitalized on when service improvement 
priorities previously agreed at a meso-level are enacted at the lower, micro-level of 
governance. Reinforcement of existing mechanisms of hierarchical control is apparent 
in the alignment of prioritized service improvement projects with relevant QOF indica-
tors or other centrally set targets. Market-based mechanisms are in operation when CCGs 
devise additional incentive schemes for supporting the implementation of those 
improvement priorities that are not covered by the QOF. And network mechanisms are 
activated when soft power of benchmarking is used in CCGs’ dealings with negative 
outliers, reflecting GPs’ competitiveness as a fundamental cultural characteristic of 
English primary care as a multi-layered network (Kislov, Hyde, and McDonald 2017; 
McDonald 2018). Translation of meanings into action in meso-level decentred govern-
ance requires rhetorical strategies to be coupled with the more tangible forms of 
resources. This significantly narrows down the number of priority setting drivers viewed 
as important at the enactment stage, potentially limiting the breadth of options available 
to meso-level network actors in terms of seeing their priorities implemented in practice. 
However, these constraints are partially offset by variability in how broadly incentiviza-
tion and benchmarking can be applied to constituent GP practices. As a result, some of 
the enactment strategies, such as selecting positive outliers for pilot projects or targeting 
negative outliers, may lead to further divergence of service improvement priorities not 
only across CCGs but also within the same CCG area.
Our findings suggest that the role of individual beliefs, experiences and preferences 
of meso-level network actors in real-world priority setting is generally seen as legit-
imate and remains unchallenged despite some differences in framing apparent between 
CCGs and general practices (cf. Rooshenas et al. 2015). This can be explained by 
a combination of factors. First, these network actors use their ‘political astuteness’ 
(Dickinson et al. 2011) or ‘craftsmanship’ (Bianchi, Nasi, and Rivenbark 2021) to 
interweave various political, financial, clinical and organizational factors in order to 
justify the selection of certain areas, programmes or projects of work for prioritization. 
Second, fluidity, malleability and internal inconsistency of narrative frames deployed 
by the actors may be an indication that these frames are not as deeply rooted in the 
actors' underlying core beliefs as would be expected in the situation of a significant 
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network conflict (Klijn and Koppenjan 2015) or political contest (Bevir and Rhodes 
2007). Finally, legitimation of these elite actors is not limited to purely discursive 
factors. In addition to the strategies of enactment described above, it also involves 
recognition of these actors’ formal status in the governance networks which, in turn, 
stems from their expertise in certain clinical areas (cultural capital) and their connec-
tions with other powerful actors within and beyond the primary care network (social 
capital), such as hospital consultants and government arm’s-length agencies. These 
findings extend previous observations about multiple sources of legitimation for actors 
operating in inter-organizational networks (Kislov, Hyde, and McDonald 2017; 
McDonald 2018) by highlighting the complex interplay between legitimation dis-
courses and different forms of capital in enacting change.
Decentred theory emphasizes radical contingency generated by diverse beliefs and 
practices of situated agents and does not aim to identify general, uniform, universally 
applicable accounts of governance processes. It is, however, important to highlight 
structural and institutional factors that may have contributed to the patterns of priority 
setting uncovered by this study (Goodwin and Grix 2011). First, characteristics of the 
network’s constituent organizations matter. CCGs are clinically led organizations by 
relatively high levels of professional discretion which promotes situated agency 
(Wright and Turner 2021). Second, relatively broad scope of the network implies 
a broader pool of underlying inconsistencies and contradictions creatively deployed 
by local actors, compared to more topic-specific ‘managed’ networks, such as regional 
networks for cancer (Addicott, McGivern, and Ferlie 2007) or health and social care 
integration (Jones 2018), which have been shown to be more amenable to central 
control. Finally, situated agency of meso-level network can be enabled by a relatively 
high degree of network fragmentation. In UK commissioning frameworks tend to be 
relatively decentralized and light-touch in terms of regulation (Bovaird, Briggs, and 
Willis 2014), with minimal unifying governance structures, ambiguous hierarchies and 
emphasis on local contingencies in favour best practice as features of the institutional 
landscape of English primary care (Gore et al. 2019). Such context is favourable for 
development of policy entrepreneurship, but multiple, albeit not always clearly deli-
neated, upstream, downstream and horizontal accountabilities (Ferlie et al. 2017) 
provide checks against excesses of situated agency of meso-level network actors.3
Limitations
Situated agency and resulting variability of priorities observed in our case are enabled by 
the relatively pluralistic, multi-layered and professionally led governance context 
described above. Our conclusions may therefore be less applicable to more hierarchical 
and centralized networks (Addicott, McGivern, and Ferlie 2007) or those governance 
structures that involve direct democratic election of representatives (Ferlie et al. 2017; 
Wolf and Bryan 2009). Our findings about the actual drivers, narratives and practices of 
priority setting decisions are derived from interviews and, although triangulation was 
conducted both across multiple accounts and across two methods of data collection, our 
conclusions are limited by the lack of observational data. On the other hand, due to our 
explicit interest in narratives of priority setting, it can be argued that interviews were the 
most appropriate method of data collection in our case (Lian 2001). Finally, whilst we 
acknowledge the consequences of population-level priority setting for bedside rationing, 
exploring the interrelationship between the two lay outside the scope of this article and 
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could be a fruitful avenue for future research on priority setting, along with studying ways 
of incorporating the views of patients and the public in the process of resource allocation.
Conclusion
This paper advances the contextual view of priority setting, addressing the call for 
building an empirical foundation of implicit priority setting (Martin and Singer 2003) 
to explore the complex interplay between macro- and meso-level structures, on the one 
hand, and situated agents and their discourses, on the other (McDonald 2018). Our 
theoretical contribution is threefold. First, we enhance understanding of how discourses 
and storylines shape interaction between actors in governance networks (Torfing 2012) 
by describing how meso-level decision-makers discursively deploy tensions and contra-
dictions between different traditions, policies and rationalities to construct situation- 
specific, even if not always internally consistent, narratives of priority setting. Second, 
we demonstrate how these priority setting narratives are enacted in practice, going 
beyond mere ‘communication of decisions to stakeholders’ described in the existing 
processual models of priority setting (Menon, Stafinski, and Martin 2007) and thus 
addressing the call to explore the challenges of downstream implementation in post- 
New Public Management forms of governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2021). Finally, we 
highlight that diverse beliefs, experiences and interests of meso-level actors, coupled 
with enabling structural factors, lead to a significant variation in service improvement 
priorities, with this analysis extending our understanding of the discretionary power of 
lower-level actors in governance networks (Hughes and Griffiths 1999).
This work raises several practical implications for those involved in designing, 
implementing and evaluating priority setting initiatives in network contexts. First, rather 
than labelling key decision-makers’ framing and legitimating activities as ‘biases’ hinder-
ing priority-setting (Hofmann 2020), these contributions should be explicitly acknowl-
edged and discussed as inherent to any priority-setting exercise, with a greater awareness 
of both their positive and negative consequences. Second, uptake of service improvement 
priorities in healthcare networks can be maximized if these projects make explicit 
connections with multiple priority-setting drivers, ensure support of key decision- 
makers at meso-level, and consider mechanisms through which implementation at the 
micro-level of healthcare providers will be incentivized and resourced. Finally, colla-
borative priority setting needs to pay attention not only to bridging differences in frames 
and discourses among actors (Klijn and Koppenjan 2015) but also to promote critical 
self-reflection targeting inconsistencies and contradictions within individual narratives.
Notes
1. In the UK context, commissioning refers to procuring services from providers, ensuring that 
they meet health and social care needs of local communities (Bovaird, Briggs, and Willis 2014).
2. The NHSs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do not follow this model as they are 
governed by devolved administrations.
3. Although the COVID-19 pandemic may have had a centralizing effect on some health and 
social care networks (Yang 2020), the recent UK White Paper (Department of Health and 
Social Care 2021) suggests that NHS is moving towards an even more networked form, with an 
increased ambiguity of hierarchies and accountabilities, which potentially makes our findings 
as pertinent now as they were at the time of data collection and analysis.
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Appendix 1. Research sample
CCG respondents GP respondents Total
Area 1 2 2 4
Area 2 2 3 5
Area 3 1 3 4
Area 4 1 1 2
Area 5 1 2 3
Area 6 3 3 6
Area 7 3 0 3
Area 8 4 2 6
Area 9 1 1 2
Area 10 1 2 3
Area 11 2 0 2
Area 12 1 1 2
Area 13 1 2 3
Total 23 22 45
We contacted 156 practices to ensure that at least one general practitioner (GP) is interviewed in each of the 
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) areas, but only 22 practices agreed to take part in the study. That explains 
why we were unable to recruit any GP research participants in two CCG areas.
Appendix 2. Final coding template
(1) Factors influencing priority setting
(1) National policy
1. Integrated care
2. Other policy drivers
(2) Population health profile
(3) Cost reduction
(4) Audit and performance data
(5) Local integrated care arrangements
(6) Personal interests
(7) Priorities set by the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG)
(8) Financial drivers
1. Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF)
2. Other financial schemes
(9) Patient experience





1. Competing national policies
2. Competing traditions/rationalities
(3) Narratives/discursive strategies
1. Switching between different criteria/drivers of priority setting
2. Switching between different traditions/rationalities
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(2) Benchmarking
1. Between CCG areas
2. Between general practices within the same CCG
(4) English primary care as institutional context
(1) NHS England
(2) Priority setting forums
1. CCG meetings
2. General practice meetings
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